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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Zoning-Petaluma: A New Land Use Ordinance in Search of a
New Judicial Standard of Review
Nearly fifty years have elapsed since the United States Supreme
Court in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,' affirmed the power of
local governments to regulate land development and established the
lenient judicial standard of "mere rationality" for reviewing local land
use regulations.2 In contrast with traditional Euclidian land regulations,
modem land use regulations reflect an increasing concern for protecting
environmental quality3 and preserving the physical4 and social charac-
ter of the locality.5 These newer, innovative regulations, however, limit
individual mobility7 and increase housing costs.8 In order to reconcile
individuals' desires to migrate and settle freely with localities' concerns
for their environment and quality of life, departure from the Euclid
standard of judicial review and the establishment of a new, more rigor-
ous standard of judicial scrutiny are required. Unfortunately, few recent
areas of constitutional law have enjoyed the unquestioning loyalty of the
federal judiciary for as long as has the Euclid judicial standard of mere
rationality.9
Dissatisfaction with application of the old Euclid minimal standard
to innovative land use regulations is revealed by the decision of Con-
struction Industry Association of Sonoma County v. Petaluma.'0 In
Petaluma the federal courts were asked for the first time to decide the
constitutionality of a local land use plan that attempted to "control [a
town's] future rate and distribution of growth."" Both the district court
and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals departed from the Euclid
standard of review, and each developed its own more rigorous stan-
1. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
2. Id. at 390; see text accompanying notes 21-25 infra.
3. Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956, 961 (1st Cir. 1972).
4. Ybarra v. Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250, 254 (9th Cir. 1974).
5. Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 6, 9 (1974).
6. Heyman, Innovative Land Regulation and Comprehensive Planning, 13 SANTA
CLARA LAWYER 183 (1972).
7. Bosselman, The Right to Move: The Need to Grow, in II MANAGEMENT &
CONTROL OF GROWTH 271 (R. Scott ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as MANAGEMENT &
CONTROL]; Franklin, Legal Dimensions to Controlling Urban Growth, in II MANAoE-
MENT & CONTROL 216, 226-30; Fielding, The Right to Travel. Another Constitutional
Standard for Local Land Use Regulations, 39 U. Cm. L. REv. 612 (1972).
8. L. SAGALYN & G. STERNLIEB, ZONING AN HOUSING CosTs (1972).
9. See text accompanying notes 29-34 infra.
10. 522 F.2d 897 (1975), rev'g 375 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
11. 375 F. Supp. 574, 576 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
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dards.1 2 An examination of the two opinions reveals, however, that
neither standard adopted in the Petaluma case by the federal courts is
adequate for reconciling the competing interests of individuals and
localities.
Like many other rural communities during the 1960's, Petaluma
was in the path of urban expansion, becoming a growth center for the
San Francisco metropolitan region.' 3 Between 1960 and 1970 its popu-
lation increased from approximately 14,035 to 24,870,14 and by No-
vember 1972 Petaluma's population was 30,500, an increase of almost
twenty-five percent in a little over two years. 5 Petaluma's maldis-
tributed growth created serious spatial and social consequences for
the city, since after 1965 almost ninety-five percent of the new construc-
tion was confined to the east side of Petaluma.' Moreover, during
the 1960's eighty-eight percent of the housing permits in Petaluma were
issued for single family homes.17
The "Petaluma Plan," the subject of the lawsuit, was intended to
correct these spatial and social problems. Central to the plan was
Petaluma's innovative attempt to preserve its rural character by limiting
its future annual residential building permits to approximately six per-
cent of the existing housing stock or five hundred units per year.'8
12. See text accompanying notes 40-62 infra.
13. 375 F. Supp. at 579. Between 1960 and 1970 Petaluma was just one of twenty-
nine communities in the San Francisco metropolitan region that sustained a residential
construction rate in excess of sixty percent of its existing housing stock. Throughout the
decade, these communities accounted for 54.7 percent of the housing permits issued in
the entire San Francisco metropolitan region. Gruen, The Economics of Petaluma:
Unconstitutional Regional Socio-Economic Impacts, in IU MANAGEMENT & CONTROL 173,
177.
14. BupAu OF THE CENsus, UNrrED STATES DEP'T OF COMMERCE, GENERAL
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS, Table 7 Population of Incorporated Places of
10,000 or More 1900 to 1970 Calif. 6-19 (1970).
15. Construction Indus. Ass'n v. Petaluma, No. 74-2100 at 1 (9th Cir., Aug. 13,
1975).
16. Gray, The City of Petaluma: Residential Development Control, in II MAN-
AGEMENT & CONTROL 149, 155.
17. 522 F.2d at 900.
18. Id. at 902. There is some uncertainty concerning the extent and duration of the
residential building permit program. The plan itself exempts requests involving four or
less housing units from the permit quota. Id. at 901 n.2. However, for purposes of its
analysis, the court of appeals did not consider the impact, if any, the exempted units
would have on the housing market. Id. at 902. Similarly, although the "Petaluma Plan"
on its face limits the restrictions to a five year period (1972-1977), id. at 901, the dis-
trict court held that official attempts had been made to perpetuate the plan through
1990. 375 F. Supp. at 576.
The "Petaluma Plan" did not rely solely on a fixed residential building permit quota
to achieve its objectives. The plan contained two other devices for managing the city's
growth. First, like some other communities attempting to manage growth, the "Petaluma
Plan" established an urban extension line to delineate the outer limits of the city's
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Through allocation of these permits, the plan encouraged multi-family,
spatially balanced, and low and moderate income development.1 9
The Petaluma case was initiated by two landowners and an associa-
tion of county builders, claiming that the restrictions imposed on the
housing market by the "Petaluma Plan" were unconstitutional. The
district court ruled that the limitations on residential building permits
below projected market levels unconstitutionally abridged the right to
travel.20 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the
district court and upheld the constitutionality of the "Petaluma Plan." 1
Before evaluating the courts' decisions, and particularly their stan-
dard of judicial review, it is necessary to examine briefly the standard of
review generally applied in land use cases. The seminal case in the field
is the United States Supreme Court decision of Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co.22 In Euclid the constitutional right of localities to
regulate lot size, building height, and land use through zoning was
challenged. The landowner principally alleged that the mere existence of
the ordinance adversely affected property values and thus constituted an
unconstitutional taking.23 The Supreme Court, recognizing that zoning
expansion for twenty or more years. 375 F. Supp. at 576. See generally Einsweiler,
Gleeson, Ball, Morris & Sprague, Comparative Description of Selected Municipal Growth
Guidance Systems, in II MANAGEMENT & CONTROL 283, 292 (1975). Secondly, Petaluma
limited expansion of its municipal facilities. For example, Petaluma purposefully limited
its water contract with the county water agency for only enough water through 1990 to
supply its needs under the reduced growth called for under its plan. Id. at 577.
19. Specifically, Petaluma allocated 255 permits for multi-family housing and 245
permits for single family housing. The permits were divided evenly between the west and
east side of Petaluma. See Gray, supra note 15, at 152. To encourage low and moderate
cost housing, eight to twelve percent of the allowed housing units are reserved for low
and moderate income persons. 522 F.2d at 901.
20. 375 F. Supp. at 581.
21. 522 F.2d at 908-09.
22. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
23. Besides the property interest of the landowner, in all land use regulations there
are some exclusionary consequences. 522 F.2d at 906. Recently, the exclusionary
aspects have dominated the concerns of commentators and judges. NAACP v. Township
of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, 724 (1975); R. BABcocK & F. BOSSELMAN,
EXCLUSIONARY ZONING: LAND USE REGULATION AND HdusING IN THE 1970's (1973). But
the matter was first considered in Euclid. In plaintiff's brief it was argued that if the
village of Euclid were lawfully empowered to remain rural and restrict the normal
industrial and business development of its land, then other comparable communities
would pursue a similar policy that would inevitably restrict and divert industrial
development throughout the Cleveland metropolitan region. 272 U.S. at 374. The district
court, concerned about the social exclusionary consequences of land use regulation, wrote
that, "In the last analysis, the result to be accomplished [by land use regulations] is to
classify the population and segregate them according to their income or situation in life."
297 F. 307, 316 (1924). Justice Sutherland writing for the Supreme Court was also
aware that the effect of land regulation was to divert natural development and warned
that in "Cases where the general public interest would so far outweigh the interest of the
municipality. .. the municipality would not be allowed to stand in the way." 272 U.S.
LAND USE
ordinances and all similar regulations find their justification in the police
power, 4 rejected the landowner's contention. To test the constitutionali-
ty of land use regulations, the Court formulated its "minimal rationality"
standard. Under this standard, the courts invalidate land use regulations
only when: (1) the regulations fall outside permissible governmental
police powers, or (2) the regulations are clearly arbitrary and unreason-
able, having no substantial relation to a permissible governmental police
power.25 The adopted standard underscores the Court's willingness to
subordinate the monetary detriment of property owners to localities'
needs for land development regulation. The localities' ability to manage
land development is further strengthened by the Euclid case through the
Supreme Court's correlative principle that even when the validity of the
regulation is debatable, the legislative judgment must be allowed to
control.26
The constitutionality of land use planning having been affirmative-
ly decided in the 1920's, courts in subsequent years have struggled to
define what constitutes a permissible exercise of the police power.
Gradually, the police power concept has expanded beyond the tradition-
al public health, safety, and general welfare concerns. 27 A major impe-
at 390. However, because the exclusionary aspect was incorporated into the landowners
taking claim, id. at 380, the Court never adequately resolved the issue. Fifty years later,
finding a suitable plaintiff still remains the primary obstacle that prevents the courts
from resolving the exclusionary issue first raised in Euclid. See Warth v. Seldin, 95 S. Ct.
2197 (1975).
24. 272 U.S. at 387.
25. Id. at 395. The problem with the due process test is that it chiefly concerns the
municipality and the landowner protecting his property; it only tangentially recognizes
the interest of the outsider who may be excluded by the land use regulation. See note 22
supra. Therefore, litigants have attempted to raise the interests of excluded nonresidents
and heighten judicial scrutiny in land cases by alleging alternative theories. Sager, Tight
Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L.
REV. 767 (1969). The problem with this approach, however, is that stringent standing
rules applied to land use cases make it difficult to argue these issues. Warth v. Seldin, 95
S. Ct. 2197 (1975). The most widely advocated doctrine for increasing judicial scrutiny
is the equal protection doctrine, Sager, supra, but except for cases involving racial dis-
crimination, United States v. Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974.), the courts have
tested allegedly unlawful land regulation classifications by a rationality standard. Village
of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8 (1974). Essentially, the rationality standard used
for equal protection analysis is identical to the Euclid standard; the only real difference
between the two tests is that cases involving equal protection claims require an additional
finding that similarly situated persons or property are being treated differently. Feiler,
Zoning: A Guide to Judicial Review, 47 J. OF URBAN L. 319, 328 (1969). Consequently,
for purposes of this note the two claims are treated under the Euclid standard described
above.
26. 272 U.S. at 388. This judicial deference to local enactments has been a major
factor in limiting the success of due process challenges to zoning legislation. Comment,
Exclusionary Use of the Planned Unit Development: Standards for Judicial Scrutiny, 8
HAnv. Civ. RIGHTs-Civ. LIm. L. REv. 384, 401-403 (1973).
27. E.g., Maher v. New Orleans, 371 F. Supp. 653 (E.D. La. 1974).
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tus for this development was the United States Supreme Court decision
in Berman v. Parker.2 8 In the Berman case, Justice Douglas, writing
for a unanimous Court, said:
The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. The values
it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as
monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine that
the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as
well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled.29
In Village of Belle Terre v. Borass0 the Court held that preserving
family values is a permissible concern under the police power.31 The
Belle Terre case was significant because, unlike Euclid and Berman
which involved geographic line drawing, the local zoning ordinance in
Belle Terre involved distinctions between individuals. Nonetheless, a
zoning ordinance that specifically excluded more than two unrelated
persons from occupying a residence in Belle Terre was upheld. The
Court rejected plaintiffs'3 2 contention that the ordinance abridged fun-
damental constitutional rights.33 In reaching its decision, the Court
reversed the attempt of the Second Circuit to infuse the rationality test
with a higher standard of judicial scrutiny.34 Instead, the Court adhered
to the minimal rationality standard announced in Euclid."'
28. 348 U.S. 26 (1954). The Berman case involved a fifth amendment challenge to
a federal urban renewal statute authorizing eminent domain. Although the police power
and the right of eminent domain authorize different activities, the Supreme Court treated
their relation to the public welfare coextensively. Id. at 32. Arguably, the judicial
deference accorded to a congressional redevelopment scheme reviewed in Berman may be
higher than the deference accorded legislative determinations of less representative
legislatures; however, subsequent cases do not make this distinction. Village of Belle
Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
29. 348 U.S. at 33.
30. 416 U.S. 1, 8 (1974).
31. Id. at 8.
32. By the time the Belle Terre case reached the Supreme Court, the excluded
tenants were no longer living in Belle Terre, and the only plaintiff to argue the case
before the Court was a landowner. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan stated that he
would have denied the landowner standing to raise the constitutional rights of the
tenants, and he argued that the case was moot. Id. at 10-12. But this contention was re-
jected by the Court. Id. at 9.
33. The constitutional rights allegedly violated were: right to travel, right to
privacy, and freedom of association. Id. at 7.
34. Essentially, the test used by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals is derived
from Gunther's analysis of the 1971 Supreme Court term. Gunther, The Supreme Court,
1971 Term-Foreward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model
for a Newer Equal Protection 86 HAiv. L. REv. 1 (1972). As formulated by the Second
Circuit, the validity of local land use classifications depends on whether the legislative
classification is in fact substantially related to a permissible objective. 476 F.2d 806, 814
(1973).
35. 416 U.S. at 3-4. Even in dissenting, Justice Marshall adhered to the Euclid
standard: "I therefore continue to adhere to the principle of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., that deference should be given to governmental judgments concerning proper land-
LAND USE
In some state courts there is a growing awareness that modem
expansive interpretations of the police power give developing municipal-
ities almost boundless freedom to regulate land use. 6 In these states,
localities' power to regulate land development in a way that curtails
individual mobility is being limited by new, more rigorous standards of
judicial review. The first of these cases was National Land and Invest-
ment Co. v. Easttown Township Board of Adjustment." In National
Land the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the contention of the
township that a four-acre minimum lot size was rationally related to
preserving its rural character.38 The Pennsylvania court, in adopting a
regional perspective, held that although orderly growth is a permissible
objective, avoidance of increased economic responsibilities and burdens,
which time and natural growth invariably bring, cannot b, the primary
consideration of the town's zoning policies.39 In Southern Burlington
County NAACP v. Mount Laurel, a case involving a multiplicity of
exclusionary land use devices, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held
that each developing municipality had an affirmative duty to enact land
use regulations that reflected the municipality's fair share of the present
and prospective regional need for housing.40
The critical factor in resolving the constitutionality of the "Peta-
luma Plan" was the selection of the appropriate standard of judicial
review. The district court was concerned with whether a municipality
capable of supporting a natural population expansion4' could legally
limit growth because it preferred not to grow at the rate dictated by
prevailing market demand. 42 In reaching its decision the court engrafted
the state regional welfare approach of National Land onto the federally
use allocation. That deference is a principle which has served this Court well and which
is necessary for the continued development of effective zoning and land-use control
mechanisms." Id. at 13 (citations omitted).
36. Vickers v. Township Comm., 37 N.J. 232, 252, 181 A.2d 129, 140 (1962)
(Hall, J., dissenting).
37. National Land and Inv. Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa.
504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
38. Id. at 529, 215 A.2d at 610.
39. Id. at 528, 532, 215 A.2d at 610, 612.
40. NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 NJ. 151, 336 A.2d 713, 724
(1975).
41. 375 F. Supp. at 583. Judge Burke found that the public facilities of Petaluma, in
place, under construction, or capable of being augmented by new capacity, were adequate
at all times for anticipated real demographic and market demands. Id. at 578. For
example, the sewerage capacity of Petaluma at the time of trial could serve approximate-
ly 6,000 to 12,000 more persons. id. at 578. Thus reference by Petaluma to alleged
inadequacies was held to be an excuse intended to justify the "Petaluma Plan" after its
adoption. Id. at 577.
42. Id. at 583.
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protected constitutional right to travel.43 It held that the "Petaluma
Plan" violated the right to travel and that the exclusion of additional
residents, in any degree, is neither a compelling interest, nor a permissi-
ble purpose within the muncipality's power to protect the public wel-
fare. 4'
Aside from the questionable propriety of incorporating state con-
stitutional principles into the federal Constitution, the decision of the
district court was needlessly broad. If preserving the city's rural charac-
ter is not a legitimate exercise of the governmental power to protect the
public welfare,45 then the court should have held that the "Petaluma
43. Id. at 584. The right to travel doctrine is not mentioned in the Constitution, yet
the courts have long recognized the right to travel as a constitutional right. Corfield v.
Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (No. 3230) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823). The first Supreme Court
decision to recognize the doctrine was Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 43-44
(1868). Since Crandall, the fourteenth amendment privileges and immunities clause,
Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270 (1900), the due process clause of the fifth amendment,
Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958), and the commerce clause of article I, Edwards v.
California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941), have been proffered to support the right of travel. In
Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964), the United States Supreme Court
found that the right was closely related to first amendment freedoms. As a penumbral
first amendment right, infringements on the right to travel must be justified by a
compelling governmental interest. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 642-44 (1969)
(concurring opinion). The right to travel doctrine is generally applied by the courts
when the exercise of mobility penalizes some other fundamental constitutional right.
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972). Occasionally, when deterence to the right to
travel itself is onerous, the courts will invalidate the restrictive legislation. Memorial
Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974). The district court opinion in the
Petaluma case is significant because it is the first case to apply the right to travel
doctrine to land use regulations.
44. 375 F. Supp. at 584. The expected impact the "Petaluma Plan" would have on
mobility and the housing market within both Petaluma and the San Francisco region
was the primary basis for the court's holding. Within the city of Petaluma, the court
determined that during the 1973-1977 period the plan prevented the construction of
approximately one-half to two-thirds of the housing units demanded by market and
demographic growth forces. Id. at 577. Regionally, the court believed that if the "Peta-
luma Plan" were enacted by other growth centers in the San Francisco Bay area, it
would increase the cost of regional housing, impede the mobility of current and pros-
pective residents, and diminish the choice of housing available to income earners with
real incomes less than $14,000 per year. Id. at 581.
45. Id. at 586. Another fact which reveals that the decision of the district court was
overbroad concerns its failure to consider a statutory basis for its decision. Ashwander v.
Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). At
least two statutory bases for invalidating the "Petaluma Plan" are possible: first, the
numerical restriction on building permits may not have been authorized by the California
zoning enabling legislation. Cf. Albrecht Realty v. Town of New Castle, 8 Misc. 2d 255,
256, 167 N.Y.S.2d 843, 844 (Sup. Ct. 1957). Secondly, preserving the rural character of
Petaluma may not have been authorized by the California zoning enabling legislation.
Cf. Kavanewsky v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 160 Conn. 397, 403, 279 A.2d 567, 570-71
(1971). The recent decisions by the Ninth Circuit in both Ybarra v. Los Altos Hills,
503 F.2d 250, 254 (9th Cir. 1974) and Petaluma, 522 F.2d at 908 are not contrary to
Kavanewsky; for in those cases the Ninth Circuit only decided that preserving a town's
rural character is within the constitutional authority of the police power. It is still
LAND USE
Plan" failed to satisfy the first requirement of the Euclid rationality test
and should have declared the ordinance unconstitutional on that basis
alone.
Furthermore, in applying a compelling interest test, the district
court drastically reduced local governmental power that was previously
presumed valid unless clearly arbitrary. Under the standard applied by
the court, infringements of the right to travel must be justified by a
compelling state interest.48 This justification, however, too stringently
impairs the city's ability to enact land use regulations, for as Chief
Justice Burger has noted:
[L]ines must be drawn. To challenge such lines by the "com-
pelling state interest" standard is to condemn them all. So far as
I am aware, no state law has ever satisfied this seemingly insur-
mountable standard, and I doubt one ever will, for it demands
nothing less than perfection.47
Because all land use regulations affect demographic and market
forces in some degree, if the holding by the district court is applied
literally, all land use regulation will give rise to a compelling state
interest standard, and all will be found invalid.48 Consequently, the
absolute standard used by the district court is actually no standard at all.
Unlike the Mount Laurel decision, the district court decision in Petalu-
ma provided no meaningful standard for distinguishing between unlaw-
ful and lawful interferences with the market force.49
The district court's reliance on demographic projections was mis-
guided. Demographic projections are not the foundation from which
possible to argue that under the California enabling legislation localities are delegated
less than plenary constitutional authority.
46. See note 43 supra.
47. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 363-64 (1972) (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
48. See note 22 supra. The striking down of the urban extension line as a
substantial deterrent to travel illustrates the broad impact the Petaluma standard adopted
by the district court might have even for traditional local land use regulations. 375 F.
Supp. at 576. Court interference with local planning is inevitable whenever the courts
analyze the substance of land use plans. Court interference, however, can be diminished
and individuals' interest in mobility protected if the courts limit their analysis to the
planning process instead of the plan's substance. Under this form of analysis the courts
would apply a first amendment, least-adverse-alternative approach whenever first amend-
ment rights such as travel were impeded. Cf. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488
(1960). In the Petaluma factual context, if this approach were applied, the court's
inquiry would be limited to determining whether the town in formulating its land use
plan considered alternative land use plans which did not impede mobility. If the town
failed to consider less adverse alternatives, the court would enjoin the implementation of
the plan until the town demonstrated that no other feasible land use plan was capable of
achieving the objectives of the town. Thus, it was unnecessary for the district court in the
Petaluma case to consider the substance of the "Petaluma Plan."
49. See text accompanying note 39 supra.
19761
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fundamental constitutional rights ought to be constructed. They are too
variable and subject to manipulation to be entrusted with protecting
basic constitutional rights.u Slavish reliance on demographic projections
will result in anti-planning. The purpose of planning is multi-faceted,
and its precise meaning is undefinable; but, since Euclid, land use
planning has meant more than unquestioning devotion to market
forces. 51
Implicit in the duty to plan for market forces is the obligation to
provide the urban infrastructure of roads, sewers, and schools which
urbanization demands. In this respect, the opinion of Judge Burke failed
to adequately consider the financial concerns of Petaluma and was,
therefore, contrary to James v. Valtierra,52 in which the Supreme Court
recognized the legitimacy of fiscal concerns as reasons for public poli-
cies.
Not surprisingly, the district court decision was reversed by the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.53 In reaching its decision, the court of
appeals announced two important holdings. First, it concluded that
neither the association of county builders nor the landowners were
within the zone of interest protected by the right to travel and that
therefore both groups lacked standing to bring the constitutional claim
on behalf of the excluded persons."4 Consequently, the court of appeals
50. The difficulty of making accurate population projections is recognized by the
experts. The United States Census Bureau warns that "since the Second World War,
fertility trends have been characterized by wide fluctuations, and as a result, accurate
predictions of fertility, and more generally of total population, have proved extremely
difficult." BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, UNITED STATES DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT
POPULATION REPORTS, SPECIAL STUDIES, FERTLmiY INDICATORS: 1970 Series P-28 No. 36,
at 47 (1971). To overcome this difficulty, the Census Bureau uses four different fertility
assumptions in making its population projections. BUREAU OF Tm CENSUS, UNrrnD
STATES DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, POPULATION EsTMATES
AND PROJECTIONS, DEMOGRAPHIC PROJECTIONS FOR THE UNITP.D STATES Series P-25 No.
476, at 4 (1972). In a ten year period, depending on which series is used the population
variances can range as high as 37.8 percent. Id. Clearly, then for the district court to
consider the 77,000 projected population for Petaluma as final was erroneous.
51. See text accompanying notes 21-25 supra.
52. 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
53. No. 74-2100.
54. Id. at 7-12. The procedural issue centers on jus tertil, the discretionary power of
the court to allow injured litigants to raise the constitutional rights of third parties. The
court of appeals, after considering: (1) the existing relationship between plaintiffs and
potential housing consumers, and (2) the practicability that other right to travel claims
attacking the "Petaluma Plan" would be brought by individuals whose rights were in fact
impeded by the plan, denied plaintiffs standing to assert the right to travel of third
parties. The decision, however, is contrary to Belle Terre. See text accompanying notes
31-32 supra. In the Belle Terre case, a landowner lacking any present relationship with
tenants or purchasers whose rights were allegedly infringed by the ordinance was
nevertheless allowed to raise the right to travel claim on their behalf. See text accompa-
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did not decide the right to travel issue.5  Secondly, it held that preserv-
ing a small town character and avoiding uncontrolled rapid growth are
constitutionally sanctioned objectives. 6 To reach the latter conclusion,
the opinion of the Ninth Circuit ostensibly relied on expansive interpre-
tations of the police power sanctioned in Berman and Belle Terre57 and
applied the traditional Euclidian standard of review.58 In doing so, the
court eschewed any suggestion that it was evaluating the wisdom of the
"Petaluma Plan."5
However, in examining the decision of the Ninth 'Circuit, it is
evident that the court tested the "Petaluma Plan" by an unannounced
balancing test. The court of appeals decision contains numerous refer-
ences to Petaluma's attempt to "provide for variety in densities and
building types and wide ranges in prices and rents."60 At one point, the
court characterized the "Petaluma Plan" as "inclusionary," since it
offered new opportunities to minorities and low and moderate income
persons.61 Since courts do not formulate a rule of constitutional law
broader than is required by the precise facts in the case,62 consideration
of the inclusionary aspects of the "Petaluma Plan" must have been
related to the constitutional standard of review applied by the Ninth
Circuit. There was no reason under the traditional test for the court to
devote so much time to characterizing the "Petaluma Plan," for if
preserving the rural character of Petaluma was a permissible exercise
of the police power, then it was irrelevant whether Petaluma's plan was
inclusionary or exclusionary. Apparently, the Ninth Circuit was un-
nying notes 31-32 supra. Moreover, the factors considered by the Court did not compel a
denial of standing. The test is impracticability of third party suits, not impossibility. Cf.
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-36 (1925). The "Petaluma Plan" reduces
the practicability that third party suits can be brought in two respects. Pirst, it reduces
housing construction, thus reducing the opportunity to establish the type of relationship
the court deems necessary for standing. 522 F.2d at 908. Secondly, the plan, by
restricting the number of residential projects, greatly reduces the opportunities to show
an interest in a project and thus establish standing under Warth v. Seldin, 95 S. Ct. 2197,
2209 (1975). Therefore since the "Petaluma Plan" itself reduces the opportunity for
third party suits, the court of appeals should have allowed the landowners to bring the
right to travel claim.
55. 522 F.2d at 906-07 n.13.
56. Id. at 906-09.
57. See text accompanying notes 27-34 supra.
58. 522 F.2d at 906-09.
59. Id. at 906.
60. E.g., id. at 901 & n.4, 905 n.10, 908 & n.16.
61. Id. at 908 & n.16.
62. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Bran-
deis, J., concurring).
63. See text accompanying notes 21-25 supra.
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willing to permit innovative, restrictive land use regulations without
balancing the existence of these restrictions against the inclusion of some
low and moderate cost housing.
Conceptually, a balancing approach allows the courts to assess the
broad policy implications presented in the case. But unless there are
clearly defined standards to indicate which factors are important, the
approach vests too much discretion in the courts. A major problem with
the Ninth Circuit's decision is its lack of guidance for future cases. The
decision failed, for example, to indicate how much inclusion is necessary
to sustain restrictive land use ordinances; thus localities will be unsure
how to develop their land use programs. Consequently, despite Judge
Choy's attempts to limit the court's role in land use matters,6 4 the Ninth
Circuit's standard of judicial review is likely to increase judicial supervi-
sion of local land use regulations.
Whatever the conceptual merits of the balancing test, its applica-
tion in the Petaluma case was irrevocably undermined when the court
denied plaintiffs standing to raise the right-to-travel argument.65 By so
holding, the court disposed of the most important issue of the case and
precluded any meaningful balancing. No one can deny that the "Petalu-
ma Plan" appears reasonable when viewed by itself. But the dispositive
issue is whether Petaluma can remain isolated. The court of appeals did
not deny that the "Petaluma Plan" will prevent the construction of
approximately one-half to two-thirds of the anticipated housing units
needed during the 1973-1977 period, nor that the plan increases the
cost of housing; 6 however, the Ninth Circuit chose not to hear these
aspects of the Petaluma case.11
Individuals' desires to migrate and settle freely are basic to our
society. 8 Affirming land use regulations that impede mobility without
even considering the concerns of individuals produces neither good land
use planning nor good judicial decisions. Ultimately, a judicial standard
that reconciles localities' concerns for environmental protection and
individuals' desires for mobility must be developed by the Supreme
Court.
IRA J. BOTVINICK
64. No. 74-2100 at 13 & n.12.
65. See text accompanying notes 53-54 supra.
66. See note 43 supra.
67. See text accompanying notes 53-54 supra.
68. See note 42 supra.
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